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Abstract 
In September 2021, the Italian Bankruptcy Law will be replaced 
by a new comprehensive Act, the so-called Business Crisis and 
Insolvency Code.  
Two topics have immediately become the “mantra” of this 
important reform: a) the introduction into the domestic legal 
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framework of early warning tools and alert procedures, along the 
lines of the French experience; and b) the introduction of a 
specific obligation on the entrepreneur or the management body 
of collective entities to implement suitable measures or establish 
appropriate organizational structures to prevent future insolvency 
and preserve the business continuity.  
These measures are closely related, insofar as the obligation to 
implement appropriate organizational arrangements is deemed 
crucial for the early warning system to be effective in preventing 
and detecting financial distress, and they should work in synergy.  
This article will focus on Italian entrepreneurs’ obligation to 
implement appropriate organizational arrangements, in order to 
evaluate its real impact on Italian micro, small, and medium-sized 
enterprises, MSMEs. Micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises 
play a key and crucial role in the Italian economy, even more 
important than in other European countries, and it is interesting 
to investigate what will change in the immediate future as a 
consequence of the abovementioned reform, and what change 
would be desirable. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Italian Bankruptcy Law (Legge fallimentare),1 adopted in 1942 
and subsequently amended numerous times, will finally be retired in 
August 2021, and will be replaced by a new comprehensive Act—the 
Code of Business Crisis and Insolvency (Codice della crisi d’impresa e 
dell’insolvenza, hereinafter “the Code”). 2 This Code was enacted by the 
Italian Government in January 2019—on the basis of a delegation granted 
	
* Associate Professor of Business Law, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Italy; email: 
alessandra.zanardo@unive.it. I am grateful to Andrew Dawson, Adrian Walters, Christoph 
Henkel, and Laura Coordes for the organization of the International Comparative 
Insolvency Symposium at the University of Miami (Nov. 14–15, 2019) and to all the 
participants for their helpful comments. 
1 Regio Decreto 16 marzo 1942, n.267, G.U. Apr. 6, 1942, n.81 (It.). 
2 Decreto Legislativo 12 gennaio 2019, n.14, G.U. Feb. 14, 2019, n.38 (It.). 
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by the Parliament3—after a long procedure started in January 2015, when 
a special Commission was appointed.4 
The Code, which consists of 391 articles, was published in the Official 
Journal on 14 February 2019, and it should have entered into force 18 
months after the publication, except for certain provisions concerning 
corporate governance, which already entered into force on March 16, 
2019. But its entry into force has been recently postponed to September 1, 
2021 due to the COVID-19 outbreak. 
The 2019 reform has heavily amended the existing bankruptcy 
(fallimento), insolvency and preventive restructuring proceedings, 
including the consumer insolvency proceeding, as well as significant 
provisions of the Italian Civil Code (hereinafter “C.c.”) concerning 
directors’ duties, supervisory bodies of companies, and the compensation 
for damages caused by negligent directors, officers, and statutory auditors. 
Although the innovations introduced by the new Code are many, two 
are topics that have become the “mantra” of the Italian reform. The first is 
the very controversial introduction into the domestic legal framework of 
early warning tools and alert procedures, along the lines of the 
consolidated French experience.5 The second is the introduction as a legal 
norm—or “as a general clause”6—of a specific obligation of the 
(individual) entrepreneur and the management body of a collective entity 
to implement suitable measures or establish appropriate organizational 
structures in carrying out the business activity,7 in order to prevent future 
insolvency and preserve the business continuity.8  
	
3 Legge 19 ottobre 2017, n.155, G.U. Oct. 30, 2017, n.254 (It.). 
4 The Commission, known as the Rordorf Commission, was chaired by Renato Rordorf, 
the then President of the first Chamber of the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation. For 
details, see Enrica M. Ghia & Filippo Bosazzi, Pre-insolvency column: Crisis management 
under Italy’s new Rordorf, GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING REV. 43–44 (Jan. 2018).  
5 Loi n.84-148 du 1 mars 1984 relative à la prévention et au règlement amiable des 
difficultés des entreprises [on the prevention and friendly settlement of business 
difficulties], J. OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
FRANCE], Mar. 2, 1984, p. 751, as subsequently amended. An exhaustive description of the 
French regulation can be found in LAETITIA ANTONINI-COCHIN & LAURENCE CAROLINE 
HENRY, DROIT DES ENTREPRISES EN DIFFICULTÉ 33–48 (2d ed. 2019); ANDRÉ JACQUEMONT 
ET AL., DROIT DES ENTREPRISES EN DIFFICULTÉ 41-52 (10th ed. 2017); FRANÇOISE 
PÉROCHON, ENTREPRISES EN DIFFICULTÉ 46–61 (10th ed. 2014). 
6 Paolo Montalenti, Gestione dell’impresa, assetti organizzativi e procedure di allerta 
dalla “Proposta Rordorf” al Codice della crisi, in AMEDEO BASSI ET AL., LA NUOVA 
DISCIPLINA DELLE PROCEDURE CONCORSUALI 482, 483 (2019).  
7 In this article, the term “organizational structure” is sometimes used for brevity to mean 
“organizational, administrative, and accounting structure”, although these three words refer 
to specific arrangements. See, infra, Part II. 
8 Indeed, another significant innovation is the introduction of an organic regulation of crisis 
and insolvency of enterprise groups. Supra note 2, at Part 1, Title VI. 
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Early warning tools and alert procedures are out-of-court, confidential 
legal mechanisms aimed at the prompt detection of signs of financial 
distress of an enterprise, including the loss of business continuity, as well 
as quick adoption of the most suitable remedies to overcome the crisis and 
restore the going concern.9 They are activated, in Italy,10 through a written 
notice sent by: a) the supervisory body of a company—the board of 
statutory auditors (collegio sindacale) or single statutory auditor,11 the 
supervisory board (in the tier-board system), the management control 
committee (in the one-tier system), and/or the external auditor or auditing 
firm—if certain sector-specific indicators are met;12 or b) certain qualified 
public creditors—namely, the Revenue Agency, the National Social 
Security Institute, and the tax collection agent—in the event of 
indebtedness for taxes (e.g., VAT) or social security contributions 
exceeding the thresholds (different for each public creditor) provided by 
the Code.13  
	
9 The Code explicitly refers to both terms: early warning or alert tools (strumenti di allerta) 
and alert procedures (procedure di allerta). See id. Art. 12. 
10 In France, differently from Italy, the early warning tools are several and involve many 
subjects or bodies: commissaire aux comptes (auditor), comité social et économique (works 
council), associés or actionnaires (company’s members o shareholders), président du 
tribunal de commerce (president of the commercial court), groupement de prévention 
agréé (prevention group accredited by an order of the State representative in the region). 
See CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] arts. L. 234-1–234-4 (Fr.); CODE 
DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] [LABOR CODE] arts. L. 2312-63–2312-69 (Fr.); CODE DE COMMERCE 
[C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L. 223-36 (Fr.); CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] 
[COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L. 225-232 (Fr.) CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL 
CODE] arts. L. 611-1–611-2-1 (France). The only French early warning tool that has been 
transplanted into the Italian legal framework is the alert procedure commenced by the 
auditors (commissaires aux comptes), even though the differences between the two national 
systems are significant: see Federico Pernazza, The Legal Transplant into Italian Law of 
the Procédure d’Alerte. Duties and Responsibilities of the Companies’ Bodies, 3(2) THE 
ITALIAN L.J. 553, 553–81 (2017); see also Federica Innocenti, Le procedure di allerta nella 
legislazione francese e nella prossima riforma delle discipline della crisi d’impresa e 
dell’insolvenza: due modelli a confronto, 4 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO SOCIETARIO 971–1003 
(2018). In particular, the alerte par le commissaire aux comptes is not based on financial 
indicators and is characterized by the involvement, in case of no or inadequate reply by the 
chairman of the board of directors or the management board, of the president of a 
commercial court instead of a non-judicial body (see infra, note 13). 
11 In Italian limited liability companies, the control body may consist of a single statutory 
auditor pursuant to Article 2477 C.c. 
12 See Art. 13 of the Code. According to some authors’ opinion, indeed, it would be 
advisable that the company statutory or external auditors activate the alert process even 
before, when there are signals of business vulnerability. See, e.g., Mauro Bini, Procedura 
di allerta: indicatori della crisi ed obbligo di segnalazione da parte degli organi di 
controllo, 38(4) LE SOCIETÀ 430–37 (2019). 
13 The notice is first sent to the debtor and, subsequently, in case of no or inadequate reply 
by the debtor or his inactivity, to the so-called OCRI—i.e., the new non-judicial body for 
the settlement of crisis: see Arts. 14 and 15 of the Code. OCRI is a panel of experts 
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The abovementioned measures are closely related, insofar as the 
obligation to implement appropriate organizational arrangements is 
deemed crucial for the alert system to be effective in detecting financial 
difficulties and preventing a business’s slide into insolvency or its 
insolvent position worsening. As a general rule, this obligation or duty 
plays a crucial role in facilitating the prevention and/or the prompt 
detection of financial crisis even when early warning tools may not 
actually be activated.14  
The debate among legal practitioners and scholars on both preventive 
measures are currently very lively and they will continue for some time, 
considering that the Code will soon be amended to revise some controversial 
aspects and, hopefully, to adapt its provisions to the recent EU Directive on 
preventive restructuring frameworks, discharge of debt and disqualifications. In 
this regard, I must point out that in February 2020 the Italian Government 
approved a draft legislative decree. This draft decree amends, among other things, 
some provisions relating to the alert mechanisms, but many aspects of the relevant 
regulation remain a moot point. 
This article will focus on the legal obligation of Italian entrepreneurs to 
establish or implement appropriate organizational structures or measures, in order 
to evaluate its impact on Italian micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises 
(MSMEs)—i.e., enterprises employing fewer than ten workers. MSMEs play a 
key and crucial role in the Italian economy, even more than in other EU Member 
States or European countries. It is therefore interesting to investigate what will 
change, if anything does, as a consequence of the 2019 reform, considering the 
size, features, and attitudes of the Italian entrepreneurs. 
The article proceeds as follows. Part II will focus on the content of the new 
entrepreneurial obligation provided by the Business Crisis and Insolvency Code. 
Part III will examine some significant issues emerging from this obligation. Part 
IV will focus on the positive and negative aspects of the provisions relating to the 
implementation of organizational arrangements. Part V will compare the Italian 
approach and trends in preventing insolvency and ensuring business viability, 
firstly with the approaches of other European countries (France, Germany, Spain, 
and the UK), and secondly with recent developments at the EU and international 
level. In Part VI, some preliminary concluding remarks will be drawn. 
	
established in each local Chamber of Commerce: see Eugenio Vaccari, The New ‘Alert 
Procedure’ in Italy: Cross-fertilization or Legal Transplant?, paper presented at 20th 
INSOL International Academics’ Colloquium (London, 2018), who investigates if and to 
what extent Italian OCRI represents an example of legal transplant or cross-fertilization 
from practices of other jurisdictions. 
14 The first type of alert can be activated only in companies where a supervisory body has 
been appointed: namely, all joint-stock companies, the limited liability companies 
exceeding certain thresholds (one out of three thresholds) or meeting specific requirements 
set forth by Article 2477 C.c., and the limited liability companies that voluntarily appoint 
one or more statutory auditors or external auditors. It is important to highlight that these 
thresholds have been significantly reduced by the Code, thus extending the number of 
limited liability companies obliged to appoint a supervisory body. 
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II. THE OBLIGATION TO IMPLEMENT APPROPRIATE 
ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS: A NEW OBLIGATION 
FOR ENTERPRISES? 
 
According to Article 375, which has amended Article 2086 C.c., and 
Article 3, para. 2, of the Code, any business entity—companies and other 
collective entities, such as (general and limited) partnerships, non-profit 
organizations, consortia, business networks15—has the duty (i) to establish 
(and maintain) an organizational, administrative, and accounting structure 
that is appropriate to the nature and the size of the business also in relation 
to the prompt detection of financial distress (crisis) and the enterprise’s 
inability to continue as a going concern; and (ii) to activate promptly the 
establishment and the implementation of one of the tools provided by the 
law for overcoming the crisis and recovering business continuity.16 This 
law provision entered into force on March 16, 2019. Its application is not 
limited to enterprises that are in the zone of insolvency or even insolvent, 
and its application has a wider scope than the detection of a financial crisis 
in its early stages.17 The use of the word “also” in Article 2086, para. 2, 
C.c. and the inclusion of such a provision in the Italian Civil Code, 
precisely in the part containing general rules on business, support this 
statement.18  
With regard to sole proprietorship, Article 3, para. 1, of the Code is 
quite different insomuch as it only provides that the individual 
entrepreneur shall adopt measures suitable to detect the status of crisis 
early and, where there is a likelihood of insolvency, adopt the necessary 
remedies promptly. This section, unlike Article 2086 C.c., is contained in 
	
15 Article 2086, para. 2, C.c. extends the obligation to “entrepreneurs that operate in 
corporate or collective form.” 
16 The reference to one of the tools provided by the law is ambiguous since it might be 
interpreted as only referring to judicial restructuring proceedings and out-of-court 
restructurings. For an extensive interpretation of this part of the rule, see Vincenzo Di 
Cataldo & Serenella Rossi, Nuove regole generali per l’impresa nel nuovo Codice della 
crisi e dell’insolvenza, 4 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO SOCIETARIO 745, 754–56 (2018). 
17 See Assonime (Association of Italian Joint-Stock Companies), Le nuove regole 
societarie sull’emersione anticipata della crisi d’impresa e gli strumenti di allerta, 
Circular No. 19/2019, http://www.assonime.it/attivita-
editoriale/circolari/Pagine/circolare-19-2019.aspx, at 20–21; Paolo Benazzo, Il Codice 
della crisi di impresa e l’organizzazione dell’imprenditore ai fini dell’allerta: diritto 
societario della crisi o crisi del diritto societario, 64(2–3) RIVISTA DELLE SOCIETÀ 274, 
275–76, and 283 (2019); Ilaria Capelli, La gestione delle società di persone dopo il Codice 
della crisi d’impresa e dell’insolvenza: una prima lettura del nuovo art. 2257, primo 
comma, c.c., 2 RIVISTA ODC 313, 317–19 (2019). 
18 Different formulations of Article 2086 C.c. and of Article 3, para. 1, of the Code will be 
discussed immediately below. 
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the Business Crisis and Insolvency Code and has not yet entered into force: 
the date of its entry into force is that of the overall reform package 
(forthcoming September 2021). The same date for both rules would have 
been more reasonable and consistent with the objective of the reform.  
I firstly point out that the new obligations cannot actually be qualified 
as an early warning tool, even though this opinion is quite common among 
scholars and commentators.19 The organizational obligations are the 
prerequisite for the efficient functioning of the alert tools and procedures, 
and they operate even in enterprises to which the early warning 
mechanisms explicitly do not apply, such as listed companies, large 
corporations, or credit institutions.20 The textual formulation of Article 12 
of the Code supports this interpretation. Article 12 delineates what early 
warning tools are permitted under the new Italian legislation.21 
Moving then to their specific content, it is beyond doubt that running 
a business—every business, whatever its size (number of workers, the 
volume of transactions, etc.) or legal status—requires a certain level of 
organization (primarily of persons) and planning, at least informal 
planning.22 The general definition of an entrepreneur, contained in Article 
2082 C.c., explicitly mentions organization as an essential requirement.23 
Therefore, some scholars and commentators—included the President of 
	
19 See, e.g., Benazzo, supra note 17, at 277, 298; Michele Perrino, Crisi di impresa e 
allerta: indici, strumenti e procedure, 36(5) IL CORRIERE GIURIDICO 653, 657–58 (2019); 
RICCARDO RANALLI, LE MISURE DI ALLERTA. DAGLI ADEGUATI ASSETTI SINO AL 
PROCEDIMENTO AVANTI ALL’OCRI 26 (2019); Paola Vella, L’allerta nel codice della crisi 
e dell’insolvenza alla luce della Direttiva (UE) 2019/1023, CRISI D’IMPRESA E INSOLVENZA 
6-10 (July 24, 2019), https://blog.ilcaso.it/libreriaFile/1124.pdf. 
20But see EUROPEAN LAW INSTITUTE, INSTRUMENT OF THE EUROPEAN LAW INSTITUTE – 
RESCUE OF BUSINESS IN INSOLVENCY LAW (2017), 
https://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/p_eli/Publications/Instrumen
t_INSOLVENCY.pdf, Recommendation 1.21 (“Member States should provide for and 
support early warning mechanisms that detect a deteriorating business development and 
signal the respective urgency to act. Possible instruments are accounting and monitoring 
duties for the debtor or the debtor’s management according to company or tax law as well 
as reporting duties under loan agreements (covenants).”). 
21 See, e.g., Luciano Panzani, Il preventive restructuring framework nella Direttiva 
2019/1023 del 20 giugno 2019 ed il codice della crisi. Assonanze e dissonanze, CRISI 
D’IMPRESA E INSOLVENZA 3–4 (Oct. 14, 2019), https://blog.ilcaso.it/libreriaFile/1134.pdf; 
Banca d’Italia [Bank of Italy], Observations on “Schema di decreto legislativo recante 
Codice della crisi di impresa e dell’insolvenza in attuazione della legge 19 ottobre 2017, 
n. 155”, Commissione Giustizia – Senato della Repubblica (26 Nov. 2018). 
22 See generally DANILO GALLETTI, LA RIPARTIZIONE DEL RISCHIO DI INSOLVENZA, 157–255 
(2006). 
23 Namely, according to Article 2082 C.c., an entrepreneur is a (natural or legal) person 
who professionally carries out an “organized” economic activity for the purpose of 
producing or exchanging goods or services. 
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the Reform Commission24—have minimized the forthcoming effects of 
the new rules, holding that the obligation to establish adequate 
organizational arrangements already existed in the domestic legal 
framework as it is an intrinsic, essential element of the basic definition of 
entrepreneur.25 
I am not persuaded by this argument, at least as regards the first part 
of the new rules (namely, the obligation to implement suitable measures 
or appropriate organizational structures). Firstly, the term “organized” 
contained in the original definition of an entrepreneur essentially refers to 
a minimum level of organization of workers and/or assets, directed and 
coordinated by the entrepreneur to carry out a business activity (Articles 
2086, para. 1, and 2555 C.c.),26 distinguishing entrepreneurs from 
independent workers.27 The new obligation introduced by the Code, 
instead, has a more defined and prescriptive content, as well as a different 
rationale—that is, primarily, the early and prompt detection of financial 
difficulties experienced by the entrepreneur and the prevention of future 
insolvency. The idea behind the provisions in both Article 2086 C.c. and 
	
24 See Renato Rordorf, Hearing before the Second Commission (Justice) of the Chamber 
of Deputies, Indagine conoscitiva in merito all’esame dello schema di decreto legislativo 
recante codice della crisi di impresa e dell’insolvenza (Dec. 4, 2018), 
https://www.camera.it/leg18/1079?idLegislatura=18&tipologia=indag&sottotipologia=c0
2_crisi&anno=2018&mese=12&giorno=04&idCommissione=02&numero=0002&file=in
dice_stenografico#stenograficoCommissione.tit00110, at 203. 
25 See, e.g., Andrea Bartalena, Le azioni di responsabilità nel codice della crisi d’impresa 
e dell’insolvenza, 41(3) IL FALLIMENTO 298, 300–01 (2019); Riccardo Russo, Collegio 
sindacale e prevenzione della crisi d’impresa, 45(1) GIURISPRUDENZA COMMERCIALE 119, 
139–40 (2018-I); Marco S. Spolidoro, Note critiche sulla “gestione dell’impresa” nel 
nuovo art. 2086 c.c. (con una postilla sul ruolo dei soci), 64(2–3) RIVISTA DELLE SOCIETÀ 
253, 262–63 and 267–68 (2019); and, under the previous law, see Vincenzo Buonocore, 
Adeguatezza, precauzione, gestione, responsabilità: chiose sull’art. 2381, commi terzo e 
quinto del codice civile, 33(1) GIURISPRUDENZA COMMERCIALE 5, 18–19 (2006-I); MARINA 
SPIOTTA, CONTINUITÀ AZIENDALE E DOVERI DEGLI ORGANI SOCIALI 32–50 (2017). But see 
Benazzo, supra note 17, at 282–85; Alessandro Nigro, Il “diritto societario della crisi”: 
nuovi orizzonti?, 63(5–6) RIVISTA DELLE SOCIETÀ 1207, 1218–19 (2018); and Roberto 
Sacchi, Sul così detto diritto societario della crisi: una categoria concettuale inutile o 
dannosa?, 41(5) LE NUOVE LEGGI CIVILI COMMENTATE 1280, 1286–87 (2018), who all offer 
an alternative, and slightly different, interpretation of the merit of these rules.  
26 Article 2086, para. 1, C.c. provides that the employer is the head of the undertaking, on 
whom his collaborators hierarchically depend. Article 2555 C.c. provides the definition of 
business (azienda), stating that it is an aggregate of assets organized by the entrepreneur 
for conducting a business activity. The key element of a business (or ongoing business) is 
the functional coordination of all assets for the purpose of carrying out a business activity. 
27 See, e.g., Antonio Cetra, La fattispecie “impresa”, in DIRITTO COMMERCIALE. I. DIRITTO 
DELL’IMPRESA 25, 33–34 (Marco Cian ed., 2017); GIAN FRANCO CAMPOBASSO, DIRITTO 
COMMERCIALE. 1. DIRITTO DELL’IMPRESA 27–28 (Mario Campobasso ed., 7th ed. 2013); 
EVA R. DESANA, L’IMPRESA FRA TRADIZIONE E INNOVAZIONE 27–30 (2018); FRANCESCO JR 
FERRARA & FRANCESCO CORSI, GLI IMPRENDITORI E LE SOCIETÀ 31-34 (14th ed. 2009).  
2020 IMPACT OF THE ITALIAN BUSINESS CRISIS 313 
 
Article 3 of the Code is that the implementation of appropriate 
organizational arrangements is a prerequisite for assuring efficient 
management of an undertaking and for preventing deterioration of the 
business. These provisions, applicable to all enterprises in any stage of 
their lifecycle, have a clear programmatic value in the reform scenario.28 
Secondly, not enough attention, I think, has been paid by 
commentators to the fact that, according to Article 2086 C.c., the collective 
enterprises are obliged to establish an “organizational, administrative, and 
accounting structure”.29 These terms—organizational, administrative, 
accounting—are not regarded as equivalent in law and managerial 
practice,30 and each of them would require specific implementation, 
though subject to a suitability assessment that takes into particular account 
the undertaking’s size and nature. 
Thirdly, those scholars who minimize the impact of these provisions 
usually mention the regulation of Italian joint-stock companies 
(s.p.a./società per azioni)—where similar provisions have been in force 
since 200431—and the widespread academic trend to interpret these rules 
as a principle applicable to limited liability companies (s.r.l./società a 
responsabilità limitata) too.32 This is absolutely true, although the new 
rules have emphasized and properly focused on the linear functional 
relationship between the obligation to implement organizational 
arrangements and prompt detection of financial crisis:33 the real innovation 
is to have extended such rules outside the scope of companies and their 
regulation.34 
	
28 Marco Cian, Crisi dell’impresa e doveri degli amministratori: i principi riformati e il 
loro possibile impatto, 42(5) LE NUOVE LEGGI CIVILI COMMENTATE 1160, 1162–63 (2019); 
Alberto Jorio, La riforma della legge fallimentare tra utopia e realtà, in AMEDEO BASSI ET 
AL., LA NUOVA DISCIPLINA DELLE PROCEDURE CONCORSUALI, supra note 6, at 413, 418–19. 
29 This formulation replicates those contained in Articles 2381, 2403 C.c., relative to, 
respectively, duties of the chairman, executive committee and managing directors, and 
duties of the board of statutory auditors of joint-stock companies. 
30 Organizational structure, for example, is a system used to define a hierarchy within an 
organization (it identifies each job, its function and where it reports to within the 
organization), whereas accounting system is a set of methods and procedures for collecting, 
classifying, summarizing, and reporting financial information. 
31 Arts. 2381, 2403 C.c. 
32 See Oreste Cagnasso, Gli assetti adeguati nella s.r.l., in ASSETTI ADEGUATI E MODELLI 
ORGANIZZATIVI NELLA CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DELLE SOCIETÀ DI CAPITALI 573, 578–80 
(Maurizio Irrera ed., 2016); Id., Gli assetti adeguati nelle società a responsabilità limitata, 
15(2) IL NUOVO DIRITTO DELLE SOCIETÀ 11, 15–17 (2017); MAURIZIO IRRERA, ASSETTI 
ORGANIZZATIVI ADEGUATI E GOVERNO DELLE SOCIETÀ DI CAPITALI 309-12 (2005). 
33 See Benazzo, supra note 17, at 286–87. 
34 See also Assonime, supra note 17, at 22–23; Niccolò Abriani & Antonio Rossi, Nuova 
disciplina della crisi d’impresa e modificazioni del codice civile: prime letture, 38(4) LE 
SOCIETÀ 393, 394–95 (2019); Stefano Ambrosini, L’adeguatezza degli assetti 
organizzativi, amministrativi e contabili e il rapporto con le misure di allerta nel quadro 
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It remains to analyze the second part of Articles 3 of the Code and 
2086 C.c., namely the obligation to take appropriate actions without delay 
to overcome the crisis and restore the going concern.  
It can be argued that, even in collective entities other than companies 
(particularly partnerships or non-profit organizations),35 directors or the 
persons responsible for the management of undertakings in the zone of 
insolvency had some obligation in this regard under the legislation 
previously in force, although a specific duty was not explicitly required.36 
They, indeed, were required to act with reasonable care and skill in 
running the business activity. The position for sole proprietorship was 
somewhat different. Under the Italian Bankruptcy Law of 1942, an 
individual entrepreneur could only be held criminally liable for 
intentionally worsening his distress by refraining from filing a petition for 
bankruptcy,37 or for undertaking seriously incautious transactions in order 
to delay the opening of the insolvency proceeding if he was then declared 
bankrupt.38 
It is therefore possible to conclude that the new law provisions are not 
merely a clarification of something already implicit in the Italian legal 




normativo riformato, CRISI D’IMPRESA E INSOLVENZA (Oct. 15, 2019), 
https://blog.ilcaso.it/libreriaFile/11354.pdf; Massimo Bianca, I nuovi doveri dell’organo di 
controllo tra codice della crisi e codice civile, 94(6) IL DIRITTO FALLIMENTARE E DELLE 
SOCIETÀ COMMERCIALI 1339, 1343 (2019-I); Di Cataldo & Rossi, supra note 16, at 751; 
Enrico Ginevra & Chiara Presciani, Il dovere di istituire assetti adeguati ex art. 2086 c.c., 
42(5) LE NUOVE LEGGI CIVILI COMMENTATE 1209, 1233 (2019); Jorio, supra note 28, at 418–
19; Montalenti, supra note 6, at 483. 
35 See Article 2260 C.c. on the liability of managing partners, and Article 28 of Decreto 
Legislativo 3 luglio 2017 n.117, G.U. Aug. 2, 2017, n.179) (It.), on the liability of the 
governing body of non-profit organizations. 
36 See, e.g., Bartalena, supra note 25, at 300–01; Spolidoro, supra note 25, at 268–69. But 
see Di Cataldo & Rossi, supra note 16, at 754. 
37 However, in Italy, unlike the majority of EU Member States, the insolvent debtor is not 
formally required to file a petition for insolvency within a specific time. See Gerard 
McCormack, Andrew Keay, Sarah Brown & Judith Dahlgreen, European Commission, 
Study on a new approach to business failure and insolvency: Comparative legal analysis 
of the Member States’ relevant provisions and practices, 48–53 (Jan. 2016). 
38 Art. 217 of the Italian Bankruptcy Law. This provision, titled “simple bankruptcy” 
(bancarotta semplice) has been transplanted in Article 323 of the Code. 
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III. OTHER SIGNIFICANT ISSUES RELEVANT TO THE NEW 
PROVISIONS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
 
Articles 3 of the Code and 2086 C.c. pose some significant practical 
and theoretical issues.  
Firstly, the implementation of organizational arrangements is 
essentially seen by Italian entrepreneurs, and sometimes by their 
representative associations, as a cost that is added to the already existing 
high costs and administrative burden.39 For a significant number of limited 
liability companies, these costs include appointing a supervisory body 
(statutory auditor/s or external auditor).40 
It must be highlighted that MSMEs—i.e., enterprises with fewer than 
ten workers—play a key and crucial role in Italy: in 2017, for example, 
micro enterprises, which amounted to 95 percent of the “operating” 
enterprises (i.e., active enterprises), contributed up to 44.5 percent of total 
employment; additionally, in 2015 SMEs contributed up to 78.7 percent 
(compared to 69.4 percent on average in the other European countries). A 
large number of these are individual entrepreneurs, and the number of 
general and limited partnerships continues to be high, even though it has 
decreased in recent years. In particular, at the end of 2019, the number of 
enterprises registered on the Italian Business Register (that includes active 
and inactive enterprises) amounted to 6,091,971, of which 1,763,011 were 
limited companies,41 966,872 were partnerships, 3,151,407 were sole 
proprietorships, and 210,681 were other types of business entity. 
Moreover, a typical feature of Italian undertakings is to be family-run or 
family-based. 
Additionally, the number of undertakings that entered a voluntary 
winding up in late 2018 and in 2019 increased, showing a deterioration in 
the profits and growth expectations of the entrepreneurs. In 2019, 78,134 
	
39 According to a survey carried out by CGIA Mestre (the Association of Artisans and 
Small Businesses of Mestre), in 2020 the cost of bureaucracy for SMEs will increase by 
around 3.7 billion euros (including the expected costs of compliance with the Code). See 
the news at http://www.cgiamestre.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Nuova-burocrazia-
2020-21.12.2019-1.pdf.  
40 See note 14, supra. 
41 A significant number of them (259,928 at the end of December 2019) are simplified 
limited liability companies (s.r.l.s.), namely companies with a minimum share capital of 
one euro and a maximum of €9,999.99. See the news at 
https://www.notariato.it/it/news/srl-semplificate-pubblicati-i-numeri-aggiornati-al-2019.  
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solvent enterprises entered a voluntary winding up.42 Furthermore, in 
2018, economic recovery for SMEs slowed down for the first time since 
2013. 
In a scenario where supporting new SMEs and businesses is vital to 
the European economy and is continually reaffirmed at the EU level, the 
introduction of a new obligation for undertakings could hinder the 
achievement of this goal and could encourage forum shopping. 
The second issue is the opportunity to make the setting up of 
organizational, administrative, and accounting structures—which are 
traditionally regarded as a prerogative of management and organizational 
sciences—the object of a precise legal norm that imposes a duty and limits 
entrepreneurial freedom. It can be countered that a similar duty has existed 
since 2004 for all Italian joint-stock companies43 and has been gradually 
extended by scholars to limited liability companies. Moreover, specific 
rules on business organization have been adopted since the late 1990s, 
imposing the establishment of organizational structures and models in 
certain companies and, sometimes, in other types of undertaking for 
various purposes.44 
Above all, the Italian Legislator, by means of the new provisions 
introduced in the Code, has actually tried to react to the chronic incapacity 
of Italian enterprises to promote early restructuring procedures 
independently, due, among other things, to their poor attitude toward 
implementing organizational arrangements. This is quite clear in the 
preparatory documents for the 2019 reform, and it is confirmed by 
empirical analysis. I only add, in this regard, that a very limited number of 
entrepreneurs in Italy establish budgets, forecast financial statements, or 
publish business plans.45 Additionally, MSMEs often have an inadequate 
	
42 See Fallimenti, procedure e chiusure di imprese, Osservatorio Cerved (Mar. 2020), 
https://know.cerved.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Oss-Chiusure-4q-2019.pdf (A 
significant number of these enterprises, however, were inactive enterprises). 
43 See Art. 2381 C.c. 
44 Decreto Legislativo 1 settembre 1993, n.385, G.U. Sept. 30, 1993, n.230 (It.) 
(Consolidated Law on Banking); Decreto Legislativo 24 febbraio 1998, n.58, G.U. Mar. 
26, 1998, n.71 (It.) (Consolidated Law on Finance) Decreto Legislativo 8 giugno 2001, 
n.231, in G.U. June 19, 2001, n.140 (It.) (providing for a direct liability of legal entities, 
companies, and associations for certain crimes committed by their representatives); 
Decreto Legislativo 7 settembre 2005, n.209, G.U. Oct. 13, 2005, n.239 (It.) (Code of 
Private Insurance); Decreto Legislativo 19 agosto 2016, n.175, G.U. Sep. 8, 2016, n.210 
(It.) (Consolidated Law on State-Owned Companies).  
45 See Vella, supra note 19, at 29. See also Rapporto Cerved PMI (Cerved, 2019), 
https://know.cerved.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Rapporto-PMI_2019_web.pdf, 
quoting a survey conducted by PwC Tls, at 123. 
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reporting system that does not allow early detection of financial distress;46 
nor are treasury systems at present widespread among Italian MSMEs.  
The third issue is the regulatory approach to extending the obligation 
to establish an organizational, administrative, and accounting structure to 
all collective entities, irrespective of their nature, form, size, and scope. 
General partnerships, non-profit organizations, legally recognized 
business networks, etc., are usually more similar, in terms of 
organizational arrangements and organizational needs, to an individual 
entrepreneur than a limited liability company, or even more to a joint-stock 
company. As I will illustrate in the next paragraph, the rule applicable to 
sole proprietorships (Article 3, para. 1, of the Code) has a more general 
and flexible content than Article 2086 C.c. We can therefore conclude that 
the requirement to establish an organizational, administrative, and 
accounting structure in collective entities other than companies raises 
some doubts about its proportionality, appropriateness, and real efficiency. 
Lastly, what organizational, administrative, and accounting structures 
are actually appropriate for a company or a business entity, in particular a 
micro or small business? This is not an easy question, as the considerable 
number of books and articles written on this topic over the years clearly 
shows.  
IV. THE OBLIGATION TO IMPLEMENT “SUITABLE MEASURES” 
OR “APPROPRIATE ORGANIZATIONAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, 
ACCOUNTING STRUCTURES”: WHAT DOES IT REALLY 
MEAN? 
 
Both provisions—the one concerning sole proprietorship and that 
concerning collective entities—are formulated in general terms. They 
refer, respectively, to the implementation of suitable measures and the 
establishment of an organizational, administrative, and accounting 
structure appropriate to the size and the nature of the undertaking. 
These quite general provisions undoubtedly make the implementation 
of organizational arrangements more effective and proportionate to each 
entrepreneurial activity and its goals. Organizational structures can look 
very different; thus, a tailor-made approach that considers the enterprise’s 
	
46 Lorenzo Stanghellini et al. (eds.), Best Practices in European Restructuring. 
Contractualised Distress Resolution in the Shadow of the Law 7 n.7 (2018); Co.Di.Re. 
Research Team, Italian National Findings (2018), https://www.codire.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/12/Italian-National-Findings.pdf, finding 1.4; Id., Italian National 
Report (2018), https://www.codire.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Italian-National-
Report.pdf, Part II, finding 3.4. 
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needs and resources is necessary. There are no pre-established schemes 
with which to comply. 
Indeed, the business complexity and the type of organization (simple, 
centralized, or multi-functional), the set of policies and procedures, the 
level of information flow, the need to implement internal control and risk 
management functions and their sophistication,47 the implementation of 
integrated software, the importance of the organizational chart and of 
formal strategic planning, the level of hierarchy, and the frequency of 
financial statements and reporting differ according to a lot of variables: the 
market in which the business operates; the typical risks to which it is 
exposed; its size, scope, and nature; and external environment factors that 
impact the business. All of these features and factors inevitably influence 
assessment of the suitability of the organizational arrangements by the 
entrepreneur/management and control bodies.  
What must be pointed out, firstly, is that the suitability test will be 
influenced by the future entry into force of the alert system, because the 
organizational structures or measures should permit the calculation of 
crisis indexes according to Article 13 of the Code.48  
Secondly, as mentioned in Part II, there is no (perfect) correspondence 
between the content of Article 3, para. 1, of the Code, relevant to the 
individual entrepreneur, and that of Article 2086 C.c., applicable to all 
collective entities. The most important difference, and probably the only 
one of real significance,49 is that the former provision generally refers to 
“suitable measures” to be implemented, while the latter refers to an 
“organizational, administrative and accounting structure appropriate to the 
size and the nature of the undertaking”. Their diverse formulation is likely 
due to the usual simplicity of the organization and planning of a sole 
proprietorship compared to that of a company, and, perhaps, to the latent 
concern of the Italian Legislator about the risk of imposing excessive costs 
on individual entrepreneurs (often artisan entrepreneurs), considering their 
size and features.50  
	
47 Specific organizational arrangements, including risk assessment programs to manage the 
risk of crisis, must be implemented by state-owned companies. See Art. 6, para. 2, of D.Lgs. 
n. 175/2016 (It.). 
48 Article 13 of the Code delegates the Italian National Council of Chartered Accountants 
and Accounting Experts (CNDCEC) to define the dashboard of indexes that reasonably let 
the businesses assume the existence of a crisis. The indexes are illustrated in the draft 
document of CNDCEC, Gli indici dell’allerta ex art. 13, co.2 Codice della Crisi e 
dell’Insolvenza (Oct. 19, 2019). 
49 But cf. Marina Spiotta, Brevi riflessioni sulle discrepanze tra gli artt. 3 e 375 c.c.i., 
ILSOCIETARIO (Oct. 7, 2019), http://ilsocietario.it/articoli/focus/brevi-riflessioni-sulle-
discrepanze-tra-gli-artt-3-e-375-cci. 
50 See also Di Cataldo & Rossi, supra note 16, at 750–51. But see Spolidoro, supra note 
25, 260–62. 
2020 IMPACT OF THE ITALIAN BUSINESS CRISIS 319 
 
It is noteworthy that the first draft version of Article 2086 C.c. referred 
to all entrepreneurs, including sole proprietorship, and so does Article 14 
of the Delegation Law No. 155/2017, setting forth the principles and 
criteria to be complied with by the Government in adopting delegated 
legislative decrees.51 The shift from a fully comprehensive provision to 
one applicable only to collective enterprises seems to confirm the 
uncertainty and the difficulty for the Italian Legislator to properly balance 
opposing needs, all fundamental to the running of business activities in a 
rapidly changing economic environment. The last version of the law 
provision has been reaffirmed by the draft legislative decree amending the 
Business Crisis and Insolvency Code, supporting the idea that the 
distinction between sole proprietorships and collective entities is, or may 
be deemed to be, a precise policy choice made by the Legislator.  
However, as I previously pointed out, there are small differences, in 
practice, between an individual entrepreneur and a general partnership or 
a non-profit organization, or other types of collective entity (e.g., a 
consortium).52 If a distinction must be made,53 it would have been more 
advisable and appropriate to limit the obligation to establish specific 
organizational structures to companies, for which this obligation seems 
proportionate. It is indeed quite clear that the Italian Legislator had in mind 
the latter when he drew up the above-mentioned section. 
In practice, what will probably be required of a sole proprietorship 
operating on a small scale, according to Article 3 of the Code, will consist 
as a general rule in the preparation of prospective financial information—
at least forecasted or projected cash flow statements54 and, possibly, 
annual budgets—in performing periodic checks and adopting an internal 
reporting system,55 and, hopefully, in systems of risk assessment (maybe 
risk assessment questionnaires).56 There is uncertainty as to whether the 
same minimum measures may be deemed appropriate in collective 
	
51 See id., at 260, n.8 (for more information about the draft version of Article 2086 C.c.). 
52 See Di Cataldo & Rossi, supra note 16, at 750–51. 
53 Id. at 753 (holding that a distinction between sole proprietorship and other types of 
enterprise, characterized by a higher degree of structural complexity, is advisable). But see 
Spolidoro, supra note 25, at 260 (arguing that the general clause contained in Article 2086 
C.c., which requires the organizational structures concretely implemented by the 
undertaking to be suitable to its nature and size, would be sufficient to avoid the risk of 
excessive burdens on micro enterprises). 
54 The cash flow forecast should be prepared more frequently than the annual accounts in 
order to permit the crisis indicators to work—in particular, the DSCR calculation. See the 
draft document of CNDCEC, supra note 48, para. 6.2. See ISAE 3400, “The Examination 
of Prospective Financial Information,” paras. 3-5 (for a definition of prospective financial 
information). 
55 See also Ambrosini, supra note 34, at 6–7. 
56 Rapporto Cerved PMI, supra note 45, at 128.  
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entities, particularly in micro entities, in light of what is expressly required 
in Article 2086 C.c.57 Although the suitability requirement discussed 
above might facilitate an extensive interpretation of the rule,58 doubts 
remain. 
V. EUROPEAN UNION AND EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AT A 
GLANCE 
 
In this new and evolving scenario, it is interesting to compare the 
Italian approach to that of the other main European countries, where the 
probability of a firm becoming insolvent is significantly lower,59 and to 
the EU and international approaches and regulatory trends. 
Firstly, I will focus on the French, German, Spanish, and UK 
approaches, which seem to differ, to some extent, from the Italian one.60  
In these countries, a general provision comparable to Article 3 of the 
Code and Article 2086 C.c., applicable to all collective entities—and to a 
certain extent, to sole proprietorships—is not provided for in either 
insolvency legislation, or civil or commercial codes. What exist are 
specific provisions relating to certain enterprises (i.e., limited liability 
companies or joint-stock companies, or enterprises exceeding some 
thresholds) or limited to a well-defined obligation (e.g., in the field of 
security and safety of workers).61 
Secondly, the recently adopted EU Directive on restructuring and 
insolvency (2019/1023)62 and supranational guidelines will be taken into 
consideration in order to ascertain if they include provisions or proposals 
that may have inspired the Italian Legislator.  
	
57 Cf. Benazzo, supra note 17, at 276, n.4, 283. 
58 See Assonime, supra note 17, at 28; see also Capelli, supra note 17, at 323–25. 
59 Cf. EUROPEAN BANKING AUTH., Risk Dashboard Annex – Credit Risk Parameters Q2 
2019 and Credit Risk Parameters Q3 2019, https://eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-
data/risk-dashboard. 
60 I will not consider, in this comparative analysis, the national legislation implementing 
Article 58 of Directive (EU) 2017/1132 of 14 June 2017, 2017 O.J. (L 169) 4 (providing 
that, in the case of a serious loss of the subscribed capital, a general meeting of shareholders 
must be called to consider whether the company should be wound up or any other measures 
taken), although this obligation could still have a warning function.  
61 See, e.g., CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] [LABOR CODE] arts. L. 4121-1–4121-4 (Fr.). 
62 The Proposal for a Directive on preventive restructuring frameworks was published in 
November 2016. See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on Preventive Restructuring Frameworks, Second Chance and 
Measures to Increase the Efficiency of Restructuring, Insolvency and Discharge 
Procedures and Amending Directive 2012/30/EU, COM (2016) 723 final (Nov. 22, 2016), 
https://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/2016-
48/proposal_40046.pdf. 




As already mentioned, in France, early warning tools have been in 
force since 1984, and there are a variety of consolidated measures or droits 
d’alerte.63 With regards to the second “mantra” of the Italian reform—
namely, the existence of specific rules imposing obligations in the field of 
business organization—the French scenario is somewhat different. 
Article L. 232-2 of the French Commercial Code provides that 
business companies with at least three hundred employees or a net 
turnover equal to or higher than 18,000,000 euros must prepare, in addition 
to other financial documents, a projected profit and loss statement and a 
projected financing plan (compte de résultat prévisionnel and plan de 
financement prévisionnel)—in other words, financial projections.64 
Moreover, these documents will be analyzed in written reports on the 
development of the company prepared by the board of directors or the 
management board (or managers in companies other than joint-stock 
companies), and the documents and reports will at the same time be 
notified to the supervisory board (where established), the auditor, and the 
works council.65 
The obligation provided by Article L. 232-2 of the Commercial Code 
also applies to partnerships, GIEs (groupements d’intérêt économique), 
and non-commercial legal persons performing an economic activity that 
exceeds certain thresholds.66 However, unlike the Italian rules discussed 
above, it only applies to large enterprises with more complex 
organizational structures.67  
It must also be pointed out that the various French alert mechanisms 
do not impose a specific obligation on the entrepreneur or its directors to 
react; they continue to have broad discretion in their conduct even after an 
alert procedure has been initiated. 68 However, inactive directors 
(dirigeants) might be held personally liable for negligence.69  
	
63 See note 10, supra. 
64 The requirement for the application of this provision are defined by a decree of the 
Conseil d’État, which also specifies the frequency, deadlines, and terms of preparation of 
the abovementioned documents. See ANTONINI-COCHIN & HENRY, supra note 5, at 23–24. 
65 CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L. 232-3 (Fr.); CODE DE 
COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L. 232-4 (Fr.). 
66 CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L. 612-2 (Fr.). 
67 See JACQUEMONT ET AL., supra note 5, at 41. 
68 PÉROCHON, supra note 5, at 54 (pointing out that the scope of these measures is to force 
the persons in charge of managing the enterprise to open their eyes).  
69 Id. 
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Lastly, the obligation of the debtor or its legal representatives70 to file 
for insolvency proceedings (whether in the form of reorganization or 
liquidation proceedings) within 45 days of the occurrence of the cessation 
of payments pursuant to Articles L. 631-4 and L. 640-4 of the Commercial 
Code cannot really be deemed equivalent to the obligation to implement 
organizational arrangements suitable to prevent enterprise insolvency, 
even though the debtor is meant to control its financial status continually. 
As previously mentioned, the focus of the new Italian law is more on the 
prevention of insolvency than on its declaration, and the relevant rules kick 
in (or should do) at an earlier stage. 
b. Germany 
 
In Germany, § 91, para. 2, of the Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz) 
requires the management board to take suitable measures, in particular 
surveillance measures, to ensure that developments threatening the 
continuation of the company are detected at an early stage. This section, 
as it is generally understood, provides for the duty to establish certain 
organizational systems,71 and it is formulated in quite general terms.72 
Such a rule, however, only applies to joint-stock companies and, by 
analogy, to large limited liability companies (despite the lack of a 
comparable rule in the Limited Liability Companies Act).73 Furthermore, 
for managing directors of German limited liability companies and 
members of the management board of joint-stock corporations, the duty to 
exercise the diligence expected of a responsible business person includes 
the duty, if a crisis threatens, to consider all possible remedial steps and to 
initiate such measures.74 
	
70 Failure to do so may lead such persons to be prohibited from being involved in the 
management of a business (so-called interdiction de gérer): see CODE DE COMMERCE [C. 
COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L. 653-8. 
71 JEAN J. DU PLESSIS ET AL., GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND 
EUROPEAN CONTEXT 486 (3d ed. 2017). 
72 See Clifford Chance LLP, Mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General (SRSG) on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other 
Business Enterprises – Corporate Law Project (Sept. 2010), https://www.business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/ruggie/corp-law-germany-clifford-
chance-for-ruggie-sep-2010.pdf, at para. 10 (stating that “[e]stablishing a monitoring 
system under the terms of the AktG does not necessarily mean that the management is 
obliged to create a comprehensive, all-encompassing risk management system. … the 
intended measures shall only ensure that possible risks are recognised at an early stage.”). 
73 Id.  
74 See Franz Aleth & Nils Derksen, Germany, in RESTRUCTURING & INSOLVENCY 184, 188 
(Catherine Balmond & Katharina Crinson eds., 2019), 
https://www.freshfields.com/49f85b/globalassets/what-we-do/regulatory/getting-the-deal-
through-2019.pdf, question No. 18. See generally, McCormack et al., supra note 37, at 45 
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It must be added that in Germany, as well as in France, when a debtor 
(i.e., a company, certain partnerships or an association) becomes illiquid 
or overindebted, the managing directors or partners or the liquidators of 
the debtor shall file a request for the opening of insolvency proceedings 
without culpable delay—at the latest, three weeks after the 
commencement of illiquidity or over-indebtedness.75 If they fail to file an 
insolvency petition, they are personally liable for damage caused to the 
company and its creditors resulting from the undue delay in filing. 
c. Spain 
 
The Spanish legal framework does not set out an obligation to 
implement organizational arrangements aimed at detecting financial 
distress early that is applicable to all businesses, irrespective of their legal 
form.  
An obligation to file for insolvency, however, is provided in Article 5, 
para. 1, of the Spanish Insolvency Law (Ley Concursal): the debtor or the 
organization’s directors must request the opening of an insolvency 
proceeding within two months following the date on which it knew, or 
should have known, about the insolvency. Late filing will lead to an 
insolvency proceeding being declared “guilty”—namely, the law 
presumes, unless proven otherwise, that the insolvency was fraudulent—
and directors may be held liable wholly or partly for the company’s 
debts.76 But I have already explained why I do not consider this rule as 
having the same impact on debtors as the new Italian law provisions. 
Notwithstanding the different regulatory approaches, it is noteworthy 
that a recent survey shows problems in Spain similar to those experienced 
by Italian enterprises: the structure of MSMEs, mostly family businesses; 
the lack of sophistication of their members or owners, who seek advice too 
	
(“[i]n most Member States there is no specific duty that requires directors to formulate 
plans to take preventative action to avoid insolvency or to identify possible insolvency 
problems, although it is arguably implicit that they do have some obligation in this regard 
as the directors should be managing the company responsibly and in such a way that is 
designed to ensure solvency … .”). 
75 INSOLVENZORDNUNG [InsO] [INSOLVENCY CODE], § 15a, translation at 
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_inso/englisch_inso.html (Ger.); 
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 42, para. 2, translation at 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/index.html (Ger.). 
76 B.O.E. 2003, 164, arts. 165, 172, and 172 bis (The court ruling classifying the insolvency 
as tortious shall also bar the persons affected by the classification from administering the 
assets of others for a period of two to fifteen years, as well as from representing or 
managing any person or company during the same period). 
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late and identify problems at a very late stage; and the still existing 
reputational damage or social stigma of insolvency proceedings.77  
d. The United Kingdom 
 
In the UK, there are no rules applicable to all businesses requiring the 
implementation of organizational arrangements aimed at the early 
detection of a crisis. However, the Insolvency Act 1986 provides specific 
prohibition of wrongful trading.78  
Sections 214 (in case of insolvent liquidation) and 246ZB (in case of 
insolvent administration) IA 1986 concern conduct—irresponsible 
trading—that occurs when the company has gone into insolvent 
liquidation or entered insolvent administration and, at some time before 
the liquidation or before the company entered administration, the director 
knew, or ought to have known, that there was no reasonable prospect that 
this could have been avoided.79 Company directors (and members of 
limited liability partnerships) may be liable to make a contribution to the 
company’s assets where they have engaged in wrongful trading.80 The 
court shall not make an order when the incumbent or former director took 
every step that he ought to have taken with a view to minimizing the 
potential loss to the company’s creditors.81  
The wrongful trading provision clearly diverges from the obligation 
provided by the Italian Code, which anticipates the responsible conduct 
	
77 Co.Di.Re. Research Team, National Findings for Spain (2018), 
https://www.codire.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Spanish-National-Findings.pdf; Id., 
National Report: Spain (2018), https://www.codire.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/12/Spanish-National-Report.pdf. 
78 See Ryan Beckwith et al., Nicholson: Decision to Keep Trading Not Always Wrongful, 
15 INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE RESCUE 157, 157 (2018) (pointing out that “wrongful 
trading … [is] one of the main ways that English law encourages directors to focus 
carefully and appropriately on the prospects of a company in financial difficulty.”). 
79 Insolvency Act 1986, c. 45, § 214 (Gr. Brit.); Insolvency Act 1986, c. 45, § 246ZB (Gr. 
Brit.). This kind of provision or similar concepts exist in other EU Member States such as 
Malta, Ireland, and Hungary. See McCormack et al., supra note 37, at 53–54. 
80 Insolvency Act 1986, c. 45, § 214 (Gr. Brit.). Apart from personal liability, where a 
director engages in wrongful trading, he may be disqualified by court order under the 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 if the court thinks fit. See Company 
Directors Disqualification Act 1986, c. 46, § 10 (Gr. Brit.). The maximum period of 
disqualification is 15 years and the person is prevented from being a director of a company, 
acting as receiver of a company’s property or in any way being concerned or taking part in 
the promotion, formation or management of a company, and acting as an insolvency 
practitioner. Id. 
81 Section 214(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986. On the issues that exist in relation to the 
bringing of actions for wrongful trading in the UK, see Andrew R. Keay, Wrongful trading: 
problems and proposals, 65 (1) NORTHERN IRELAND LEGAL QUARTERLY 63–79 (2014). 
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and prudent evaluation of the debtor. But it is relevant to the topic at hand, 
since it is intended to operate at an early stage too (“at some time before 
the commencement of the winding up of the company”),82 although there 
are relatively few reported cases and relatively few successes. 
e. European Union and International Soft Legislation 
 
As regards the European Union, after Recommendation 
2014/135/EU,83 the long-awaited EU Directive on preventive restructuring 
frameworks, discharge of debt and disqualifications was finally adopted 
on June 20, 2019. 
Article 19 of the Directive provides, in very general terms, that 
Member States shall ensure that, where there is a likelihood of insolvency, 
directors have due regard, among other things, to take steps to avoid 
insolvency. Article 19 does not specify which legislative model or 
regulatory approach should be used by the Member States to pursue this 
aim: it allows them to retain flexibility as to the most appropriate means 
to implement this principle. They could, for example, make use of early 
warning tools where applicable, and/or seek professional advice, or even 
introduce specific directors’ fiduciary duties toward creditors (in 
particular, when the company has become insolvent or is in the zone of 
insolvency).  
The underlying rationale of Article 19 is to obligate Member States to 
impose specific duties on directors in the vicinity of insolvency which will 
incentivize them to pursue early restructuring while the business is viable. 
In particular, as stated in the European Commission Proposal, “rules on 
company managers’ duty of care when nearing insolvency also play an 
important role in developing a culture of business rescue instead of 
liquidation, as they encourage early restructuring, prevent misconduct and 
avoidable losses for creditors.”84 
First, the provision refers to “directors,” and thus, it applies only to 
certain business entities (in particular, it does not apply to sole 
proprietorships).85 Secondly, comparing its content with that of the 
corresponding Italian law provisions, it seems quite evident that the Italian 
Legislator has taken a step forward by introducing the obligation to 
	
82 Section 214(2)(b) of the Insolvency Act 1986. See MICHAEL J. MUMFORD & ALAN J. 
KATZ, MAKING CREDITOR PROTECTION EFFECTIVE 51-52 (2010). 
83 Commission Recommendation of 12 March 2014 on a new approach to business failure 
and insolvency. 
84 See Explanatory Memorandum, para. 1 (“Objective of the proposal”), of the Proposal for 
Directive [COM (2016) 723 final], supra note 62. 
85 The provision has been partially revised in the last version of the Directive, but without 
a real impact on the issue dealt with in this article.  
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implement an appropriate organizational set-up even if the business 
entity—and, to some extent, the sole proprietorship—is not yet insolvent 
or in the zone of insolvency. 
The scenario would have been slightly different if some of the 
suggested amendments to the provision on duties of directors had been 
accepted by the EU institutions.86 In this regard, it must be pointed out that 
the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law87 explicitly 
mentions and recommends a list of appropriate operating steps that 
directors might take to avoid insolvency or, where it is unavoidable, to 
minimize the extent of insolvency. These steps include evaluating the 
current financial situation of the company and ensuring proper accounts 
are being maintained and that they are up-to-date; being independently 
informed as to the current and ongoing financial situation of the company; 
and seeking professional advice, including insolvency or legal advice, so 
that any decisions taken can withstand objective and independent 
scrutiny.88 The rationale of these UNCITRAL Recommendations seems 
close to that of Article 3 of the Code and Article 2086 C.c.  
Moving to the early warning, Article 3 of the Directive explicitly 
requires Member States to “ensure that debtors have access to one or more 
clear and transparent early warning tools which can detect circumstances 
that could give rise to a likelihood of insolvency and can signal to them 
the need to act without delay”. This provision, as well as Recital No. 22 
(“… one or more early warning tools should therefore be put in place to 
incentivise debtors that start to experience financial difficulties to take 
early action”), shows some similarities at least with Article 3, para. 1, of 
	
86 See the amendments to Article 18 (now Article 19) suggested by the Co.Di.Re. Research 
Team, which proposed to introduce the following paragraph: “2. The measures expected 
from directors under paragraph 1 might include, among others: the commencement of 
honest negotiations with the relevant stakeholders with a view to reaching an agreement, 
either by restructuring bilaterally the obligations or by using one of the out-of-court tools 
or proceedings existing in the jurisdiction; gathering and evaluating the financial situation 
of the business, including, when necessary and feasible, requesting independent advice; 
increasing communication amongst directors, and between the former and financial 
controllers and the auditor of the entity; modifying management practice to take account 
of the interests of creditors and other relevant stakeholders; adopting measures to protect 
the value of the key company assets; adopting measures to ensure the continuation of the 
debtor’s business when the directors have reasonable grounds for believing that to do so is 
in the interests of the creditors as a whole; requesting the commencement of formal 
insolvency proceedings.”. See Co.Di.Re. Research Team, Comments to the Proposal for 
Directive [COM(2016) 723 final] (2018), http://www.codire.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/07/Re-drafting-suggestions-for-the-EU-Directive-ver-11-final.pdf. 
87 U.N. COMM’N. ON INT’L TRADE LAW LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW. PART 
FOUR: DIRECTORS’ OBLIGATIONS IN THE PERIOD APPROACHING INSOLVENCY, U.N. Sales No. 
E.13.V.10. (2013). 
88 Id. at 13–14 (Recommendations 255–256). 
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the Code, even though the real impact of the supranational provision will 
depend on its implementation by the Member States.  
In this scenario, the Italian law provisions may be meant as strict rules, 
and the perspective of the domestic legislation appears to be broader than 
that of the European Union.  
It is then noteworthy that the Commission Proposal of 22 November 
2016, in Recital No. 16, stated that possible early warning tools should 
include accounting and monitoring duties for the debtor or the debtor’s 
management, as well as reporting duties under loan agreements.89 This 
statement, however, does not appear in the corresponding Recital No. 22 
of the Directive (EU) 2019/1023.  
To conclude and complete the analysis, it is opportune to mention 
Article 19 of Directive 2013/34/EU, the Accounting Directive.90 It 
provides that the management report shall include a description of the 
principal risks and uncertainties that it faces, and it may be reasonably held 
that the requirement to disclose the main risks and uncertainties in the 
annual (and interim) reports obliges companies to install at least a risk and 
uncertainty identification system.91 But, again, the scope of the Directive 
is limited to specific types of undertaking, listed in Annexes I and II, and 
does not encompass all businesses.92 Furthermore, according to Article 19, 
para. 3, it is possible for Member States to exempt small (and micro) 
undertakings from the obligation to prepare management reports, 




89 Cf. STANGHELLINI ET AL., supra note 46, at 7 (“While it may be considered very creative 
and, in fact, euphemistic to qualify personal or management duties as ‘tools’ that debtors 
should be given access to and receive concise information about, this approach seems 
sensible in theory. Its problems lie on the practical side.”). 
90 Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
on the Annual Financial Statements, Consolidated Financial Statements, and Related 
Reports of Certain Types of Undertakings, Amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and Repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC 
and 83/349/EEC, 2013 O.J. (L 182) 19. 
91 Gaia Balp, Early warning tools at the crossroads of insolvency law and company law 
24-25 (BOCCONI LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER NO. 3010300, 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3010300; Christoph Van der Elst, The Risk Management Duties 
of the Board of Directors 7 (FINANCIAL LAW INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES 2013-02, 
2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267502. 
92 See Directive 2013/34/EU, supra note 90. 
93 Id.  




To sum up, Article 2086 C.c. and, to a certain extent, Article 3 of the 
Code may be meant as strict rules. Their rationale is clear and, in principle, 
shareable if we focus on the main objective of the reform—that is the 
detection of enterprises’ financial difficulties at an early stage and the 
prevention of insolvency. 
Some issues and doubts about their effectiveness arise if we look at 
the side effects of the new domestic rules when the obligation to 
implement appropriate organizational arrangements, though tailor-made, 
applies to MSMEs—in particular, to a sole proprietorship, a general or 
limited partnership, or a non-profit organization. 
Apart from the risk of forum shopping,94 what are these side effects? 
Firstly, implementation of the prescribed organizational measures will 
undoubtedly increase the compliance burden and the normal costs for 
MSMEs,95 at least in the short to medium term, whereas Italian 
entrepreneurs, as a general rule, are far from recognizing the importance 
of internal control and reporting systems, or the need to plan their business 
activities. In this scenario, the trade-off between the perceived benefits of 
an appropriate organizational structure and its perceived costs will be 
negative—that is, the perceived costs will exceed the perceived benefits.  
Secondly, apart from the limited resources of MSMEs, there is a 
concrete risk of non-effectiveness (or incomplete effectiveness) of the new 
provisions due to the scarce entrepreneurial incentives to observe the law 
prescriptions. 96  
Violation of the obligation to implement suitable measures or to 
establish appropriate organizational structures is not adequately 
sanctioned by the law, in particular if the non-compliant entity is a sole 
proprietorship, to whom the legal provisions on duties and liability of 
	
94 See Giovanni Strampelli, Verso una disciplina europea dei doveri degli amministratori 
nella società in crisi?, in AMEDEO BASSI ET AL., LA NUOVA DISCIPLINA DELLE PROCEDURE 
CONCORSUALI, supra note 6, at 637, 642-43. See also Irit Mevorach, Forum Shopping in 
Times of Crisis: A Directors’ Duties Perspective, 10(4) EUR. CO. & FIN. REV., 523-53 
(2013) (for a general discussion on forum shopping by companies in close proximity to 
insolvency). 
95 See Rapporto Cerved PMI, supra note 45, at 127-33, where an in-depth analysis of 
compliance costs for SMEs is carried out. See also id. at 134-38, where the report also 
evaluates the possible positive effects of the new mechanisms to detect financial distress 
in terms of enterprise restructuring or more efficient liquidation of the remaining assets, 
and it estimates that the overall benefits will greatly exceed the costs in the event of full 
compliance. 
96 Id. at 129 (explaining that the estimated implementation of measures to detect signals of 
crisis will be especially low in micro enterprises without a supervisory body, and these 
enterprises will prefer elementary systems). 
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directors do not apply, or a general partner, who has unlimited liability for 
all partnership debts.97 
In addition, as previously mentioned, the obligation to set up an 
organizational arrangement is strictly linked to the functioning of the early 
warning mechanisms and to the scope to detect financial difficulties 
threatening the continuation of the business early. However, there is not a 
perfect correspondence, in practice, between those enterprises under the 
obligation to establish a suitable organizational, administrative, and 
accounting system and to take appropriate actions and those effectively 
involved in the forthcoming Italian alert procedures. In Italy, differently 
from the various mesures d’alerte provided by the French Code de 
commerce, the early warning tools consist essentially of a warning notice 
by qualified public creditors when the debtor has not made certain types 
of payment (taxes or social security contributions),98 or a warning notice 
by the supervisory bodies and/or external auditors of the company. If the 
business entity has no supervisory body or auditor—that is, it is a 
partnership, a non-profit organization, a consortium, or a limited liability 
company that does not exceed certain thresholds—or the debtor is an 
individual entrepreneur, the latter mechanism cannot be activated. Even 
among companies, those without any supervisory body are the large 
majority in Italy.  
Thirdly, according to Article 25 of the Code, a business entity that 
takes prompt and suitable measures in order to overcome financial 
difficulties would have non-negligible advantages, in terms of exemption 
from personal liability and criminal offences (or penalty reduction), and 
reduction of tax sanctions and interest rate. The adoption of a clear-cut 
organizational structure is a prerequisite for taking prompt and active steps 
and, thus, to benefiting from such advantages. But Italian entrepreneurs 
are traditionally reluctant to reveal their financial difficulties 
spontaneously and address them openly, or to draw the obvious 
conclusions emerging from their financial statements and accounts. Apart 
from socio-cultural factors and the typical features of Italian 
undertakings—the separation between ownership and control is very 
uncommon and the number of owner-managers is considerably high99—
	
97 See Di Cataldo & Rossi, supra note 16, at 751. 
98 The most common and valid criticism of this alert tool is that by the time the qualified 
public creditor highlights any serious delay in payments, insolvency has already kicked in. 
See Roberto Fontana, Hearing before the Second Commission (Justice) of the Chamber of 
Deputies, Indagine conoscitiva in merito all’esame dello schema di decreto legislativo 
recante codice della crisi di impresa e dell’insolvenza (Dec. 4, 2018), supra note 24, at 9-
11. 
99 See Alberto Jorio, Su allerta e dintorni, 43(3) GIURISPRUDENZA COMMERCIALE 261, 263 
(2016-I). 
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crisis situations produce additional risks for businesses (e.g., a rush to the 
exit for creditors), thus discouraging the entrepreneur’s active role. This 
reluctance to file for insolvency or restructuring proceedings, or the habit 
to do so very late, is hard to overcome.  
Lastly, the approach of the abovementioned European countries, 
where provisions on debtor/directors’ obligations only affect debtors that 
are large enterprises or limited companies, confirms doubts about the 
effectiveness and appropriateness of the new Italian rules. 
However, the rigid Italian approach compared to other countries could 
also have a positive effect. It may lead to a change of entrepreneurial 
culture and mentality and facilitate the development of a forward-looking 
rather than a backward-looking approach, by incentivizing the 
entrepreneurs to plan their business and periodically review their strategic 
plans. In other words, the introduction of the obligation to implement 
organizational arrangements could help, in the non-immediate future, to 
promote virtuous entrepreneurial behaviors,100 also considering the 
possible positive effects of the new legislative measures on MSMEs’ 
access to credit.101 
This, I believe, is the real gamble of the Italian insolvency reform. 
 
	
100 See also Alberto Jorio, supra note 28, at 435. 
101 See Rapporto Cerved PMI, supra note 45, at 137–38. 
